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COMMENTS
ELEMENTS OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
The attractive nuisance doctrine, so called, presents an interesting
example of the conflict between age-old principles of the common law
and modern humanitarian concepts. One of the fundamental rules gov-
erning the liability of the possessor of land for injuries caused to per-
sons entering his land is the maxim that the possessor is not liable
for harm to trespassers caused by his failures to safely provide for
their reception.1 The sound foundation and justice of the rule that a
trespasser, entering without right or privilege, has assumed the risk is
readily apparent, at least where the trespass is an intentional violation
of the right of the owner occupier of land to exclusive possession. Even
where the trespass is unintentional, a consideration of the rule in the
light of the burden that a contrary rule would place upon possessors
of land justifies the proposition that, as between possessor and tres-
passer, the latter must bear the loss. Property rights are of great im-
portance in our law, and, in the case of a trespasser, we do not hesitate
to affirm the precedence of the property right of exclusive possession
over the personal rights of those who come upon the land Without
license or invitation. 2 We do not cast upon the possessor of land the
burden of watching for and protecting trespassers.3
A trespasser is one who is upon the land of another without right
or privilege. The definition carries no exception as to the age of such
a person. Age is immaterial as bearing upon his status as a trespasser.4
A child wrongfully upon another's land is as much a trespasser as an
adult in the same situation and is subject to the same general rule of
non-liability for injuries to trespassers as is applicable to adults.5
However, the propensities of children to trespass are obvious. A
child at play knows no boundary lines beyond which he may not go,
especially when there is an instrumentality on or condition of the land
beyond the boundary to which he is attracted. Realizing these facts,
and recognizing the inability of children of tender years to appreciate
the dangers of trespassing, the courts have developed what is com-
conly called the attractive nuisance doctrine. Despite the attempts of
of some of the courts to fit the doctrine into existing rules of law so
as not to create an exception to the general rule of non-liability,6 the
fact remains that under the doctrine an infant trespasser can recover
for injuries sustained while trespassing upon another's land.
1 65 C.J.S., Negligence §24; Prosser on Torts, sec. 77.
2Prosser on Torts, supra, note 1.
3 Prosser on Torts, supra, note 1.
465 C.J.S., Negligence §27.
5Supra, note 4.6 38 Am. Jur., Negligence §144.
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The basic problem encountered in any consideration of the attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine is the question: What is an "attractive nuisance?"
The question is vital because, as has been pointed out, the mere fact
of childhood does not remove a trespasser from that class and give
him any preferred status. And the cases show that the attractive nui-
sance doctrine does not operate to remove a child trespasser from that
class and hence from the operation of the non-liability rule, but rather
it operates through the instrumentality which caused the child's injury
and allows recovery despite the fact that the child was and remained
a trespasser.8 Or, under another view, it at least operates through the
instrumentality to remove the child from the trespasser class because
of the character of the instrumentality. 9 It becomes obvious that the
core of the problem is to know exactly what constitutes an attractive
nuisance. The present inquiry will view the doctrine in that light in
an attempt to arrive at some aids to solution of the problem.
The attractive nuisance doctrine received its first wide recognition
in this country following the first decision on the subject by the United
States Supreme Court in Sioux City & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Stout, 0
though the doctrine had been developed earlier in England.'" In the
Stout case, decided in 1873, the plaintiff, a child of six, was injured
when playing with other boys upon an unguarded and unlocked turn-
table on the property of the defendant railroad. The Supreme Court
affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff despite the fact that the child
was a trespasser, holding the defendant guilty of negligence in not
properly guarding or fastening the turntable.
Under this and other early cases liability was placed upon the oc-
cupier of land where he maintained upon his premises in instrumental-
ity inherently dangerous and attractive to children of tender years,
when he knew or should have known that it was dangerous and attrac-
tive to children and that children would be likely to trespass upon the
land because of the "attractive nuisance," and where the utility of
maintaining the object was slight as compared to the risk to children.' 2
7 Supra, note 4.
865 C..S., Negligence §29(1).
9 Wheeler v. City of St Helens, 153 Or. 610, 58 P.(2d) 501 (1936): "The attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine in no way alters or expands the principle of negligence.
It concerns itself with the status of the child. If he, without express invitation,
was lured upon the land of another by the display of an attractive object which
was kept there, the attractive nuisance doctrine changes his status from tres-
passer to invitee." The holding is typical of those jurisdictions supporting
this view. Contra: Gimmestad v. Rose Bros. Co.,. 194 Minn. 531, 261 N.W.
194 (1935) (where the court vigorously denounces the theory).
10 17 Wall. 657, 21 L.Ed. 745 (1873).
"Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q.B. 30, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841) (This case, though it
involved trespass to pdrsonalty, a cart left in the city street, is generally re-
garded as the beginning of the attractive nuisance doctrine.)
2 Sioux City & Pac. R. Co. v. Stout, supra, note 10; Keefe v. Milwaukee & St.
P. Ry. Co., 21 Minn. 207 (1875) ; O'Malley v. St Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 43
Minn. 289, 45 N.W. 440 (1890).
1"951]
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The dangerous instrumentality in the Stout case, and in many of the
early cases, was a railroad turntable, and from this fact the doctrine
is sometimes called the "turntable doctrine."
In these early cases much emphasis was placed upon the fact that
the turntable or other instrumentality was in such a position as naturally
to attract children to trespass, because from such fact the defendant
could be expected to anticipate a trespass and know of the danger to
children.13 Furthermore, it was necessary for an application of the
doctrine that the child be induced to trespass by reason of the attractive
instrumentality. 14 It was insufficient that the child first trespass and,
once upon the land, be attracted to the object causing injury;or that
the injury be caused to the trespassing child by some dangerous object
without any element of attraction.15 In O'Malley v. St. Paul, M. & M.
Ry. Co. 1 6 the court said:
"To impose the duty of care, the machine must be such that it
is dangerous for every young child to play with or about it, it
must be of such a character that such children would naturally
be attracted to play with or about it, and it must be where they
are likely to come for that purpose, so that an ordinarily prudent
person would anticipate that they might come for that purpose."
The effect of such a rule is well demonstrated by the case of United
Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt." In that case children were trespassing
upon defendant's land and, after they were on the land, were attracted
to a pool of water apparently pure but actually poisoned by chemicals.
The children attempted to swim in the pool and were killed by the
effects of the poison. While it would seem that recovery should have
been available on the theory that the pool was a trap, another exception
to the rule of non-liability of landowner to trespassers, the plaintiff
based his case upon the attractive nuisance doctrine. Recovery was
denied, and Mr. Justice Holmes gave as the reason that the attractive
nuisance doctrine was inapplicable where the children were not in-
duced to trespass by the object causing injury. He said:
"In the case at bar it is at least doubtful whether the water could
be seen from any place where the children lawfully were, and
there is no evidence that is was what led them to enter the land.
But that is necessary to start the supposed duty."
The rule that the attractive nuisance doctrine is inapplicable where the
object causing injury did not induce trespass is a distinct limitation
13 O'Malley v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., supra, note 12.
14 Keefe v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co., supra, note 12; O'Malley v. St. Paul,
M. & M. Ry. Co., supra, note 12; United Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258
U.S. 268, 42 S.Ct. 299, 66 L.Ed. 615 (1921) ; Battin v. Cornwall, 218 Iowa 42,
253 N.W. 842 (1935).
15 United Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt, supra, note 14.26Supra, note 12.
1 Supra, note 14.
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upon the doctrine. It excludes from classification as attractive nui-
sances all objects, however attractive and dangerous to children, which
are not in such a position as to be seen from without the land and
induce the trespass upon the land culminating in injury.
But the attractive nuisance doctrine has been liberalized to a great
extent by many of the courts, and this liberal view is most ably stated
by the Restatement of Torts :18
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to
young children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or
other artificial condition which he maintains upon the land if
a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon
which the possessor knows or should know that such chil-
dren are likely to trespass, and
b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or
should know and which he realizes or should realize as
involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily
harm to such children, and
c) the children, because of their youth, do not discover the
condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in
it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition
slight as compared to the risk to young children involved
therein."
In commenting upon the rule the Restatement says:
"Therefore, the possessor is subject to liability to children who
after entering the land are attracted into dangerous intermeddl-
ing by such a condition maintained by him although they were
ignorant of its existence until after they had entered the land,
if he knows or should know that the place is one upon which
children are likely to trespass and that the condition is one with
which they are likely to meddle."1 9
This view removes the limitation discussed above. The Restatement
view has been adopted verbatim by some courts,20 and others, before
and after the promulgation of the Restatement, have adopted it in
effect,21 Wisconsin being in the latter class, except as qualified, infra.
22
The case of Nelson v. McLellan73 is precisely in point. In that case
plaintiff and another, both young boys, were trespassing upon a lot
owned by the defendant upon which he had kept a box of dynamite
Is Restatement, Torts, §339.
19 Supra, note 18.
20Louisville & N.LCo. v. Vaughn, 292 Ky. 120, 166 S.W. 43 (1942) ; Gimmestad
v. Rose Bros. Co., supra, note 9.
21 Nelson v. McLellan, 31 Wash. 208, 71 P. 747 (1903); Krachanake v. Acme
Mfg. Co., 175 N.C. 435, 95 S.E. 851 (1918); Angelier v. Red Star Yeast Co.,
215 Wis. 47, 254 N.W. 351 (1934).2 2 Angelier v. Red Star Yeast Co., supra, note 21.
2 3 Supra, note 21.
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used for construction purposes, the lot being located where trespass by
children at play was to be anticipated. After they had entered the lot,
the bbys found the box of dynamite sticks and, thinking them to be
firecrackers, exploded one, causing severe injury to the plaintiff. Re-
covery under the attractive nuisance doctrine was allowed, despite the
fact that inducement followed trespass and was not the cause of it.
A comparison of the fact situation in this case with that of the Britt
case, supra, where recovery was denied, indicates that they are almost
identical.
This extension of the doctrine seems logical, for it is actually un-
important that the attraction occured before or after the trespass
as long as the possessor had real or constructive knowledge that the
children would be likely to trespass upon that part of the land where
the condition was maintained, and that the condition created an unrea-
sonable risk to them. This becomes obvious when it is considered that
the attractive nuisance doctrine renders the fact of trespass immaterial.
But the courts have not stopped at this extension of the doctrine.
In several jurisdictions, including Wisconsin, 4 the cause of injury need
not attract the child at any time in order to allow a recovery under the
attractive nuisance doctrine. In the Wisconsin case of Angelier v.
Red Star Yeast Co.28 the plaintiff, a boy of thirteen, was injured while
playing upon the defendant's land with the defendant's knowledge. He
fell into an open trough of boiling refuse which he failed to see because
absorbed in play. The Wisconsin court allowed recovery under the
attractive nuisance doctrine (and it appears that the label here is a
misnomer), adopting in effect the Restatement rule, and expressly
overruling two earlier Wisconsin cases which had rejected the doctrine
entirely.27
The United States Supreme Court, on a fact situation almost iden-
tical to that in the Angelier case, held as early as 1893 that a child tres-
passer could recover under the doctrine where the object causing the
injury contained no element of attraction, but was actually more in
the nature of a trap.28 In that case the child was running along a nar-
row path bordering a pile of refuse from a coal mine which, though
unnoticeable from the outside, was burning underneath. The child
fell into the fire and was severely burned. There is some dispute as
to whether the later case of United Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt,
24 Angelier v. Red Star Yeast Co., supra, note 21.
25Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. McDonald, 152 U.S. 262, 14 S.Ct 619, 38 L.Ed. 434
(1893) ; Angelier v. Red Star Yeast Co., supra, note 21.26 Supra, note 21.
27 Zartner v. George, 156 Wis. 131, 145 N.W. 971 (1914); Lewko v. Chas. A.
Krause Milling Co., 179 Wis. 83, 190 N.W. 924 (1922).
28Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. McDonald, supra, note 25.29 Supra, note 14.
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supra, overrules this case,80 but the majority opinion in the Britt case
and a later attractive nuisance case 31 hold that it does not.
It has been seen that the attractiveness of the object causing the
injury is of less importance under more liberal interpretations of the
doctrine and, in fact, altogether immaterial under a class of cases typi-
fied by the Angelier case in Wisconsin. But while certain of the courts
will extend the doctrine on the question of attractiveness, the universal
tendency is to limit it with regard to other characteristics of the object
causing the injury.32
One of the important considerations in any application of the doc-
trine is the rule that a possessor of land will not be liable for injuries
caused by the maintenance of an object dangerous to children where
the utility of maintaining the object is great as compared to the risk
involved to trespassing children.3 3 The Wisconsin court draws the dis-
tinction between lawful attractive objects and attractive nuisances.3'
Thus where the utility to the possessor of maintaining the dangerous
and attractive object, or of maintaining it in its dangerous and attrac-
tive state unguarded or unsecured, is greater than the risk to trespass-
ing children, the object is not an attractive nuisance at all, but a law-
ful object, and it is without the operation of the doctrine. The point
is well put by Corpus Juris Secundum :3
"Not every instrumentality attractive to children constitutes an
attractive nuisance under the attractive nuisance doctrine. A
statement that any agency which is dangerous and attractive to
children may constitute an attractive nuisance is entirely too
broad, and leads to absurdities, since there is practically no limit
to what may attract children. It is manifest that many things
ordinarily in existence and use throughout the country are both
attractive and dangerous to children, and to hold that such things
amount to an implied invitation to enter would be contrary to
reason, would lead to vexatious and oppressive litigation, and
impose upon property owners such a burden of vigilance and
care as would materially impair the value of property and seri-
ously cripple the business of the country."
Accordingly, the courts have set very definite limitations upon what
can amount to an attractive nuisance. A vast number of potential at-
tractive nuisances are excluded by the rule that the doctrine applies
only to artificial conditions and is inapplicable to natural conditions.3 "
The courts consider as excessive the burden which might be imposed
30 See United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, supra, note 14 (dissenting opinion).
3 1 Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411, 54 S.Ct 487, 78 L.Ed. 635 (1933).
32 65 C.J.S. Negligence §29(3), (4) and (7).
33 65 C.J.S. Negligence §29(8) ; supra, note 18.
34 Emond v. Kimberly-Clark Co., 159 Wis. 83, 149 N.W. 760 (1914).
3565 C.J.S. Negligence §29(4).
36 65 C.J.S. Negligence §29(7) ; Fiel v. City of Racine, 203 Wis. 149, 233 N.W.
611 (1930).
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upon landowners if every pond, lake, tree, etc., upon which children
might be expected to tresspass had to be fenced or otherwise guarded
in order that the landowner be free from liability.3 7
The doctrine is further limited by the requirements that the object
labelled "attractive nuisance" must be inherently dangerous to chil-
dren,3a and, in jurisdictions where attraction is an element, it must be
unusually attractive and alluring.3 9 Above and beyond this the courts
have enumerated various specific objects which are or are not attractive
nuisances.40 For example, a turntable is almost always an attractive
nuisance,41 while a building, even under construction, usually is not.42
From the foregoing it will be appreciated that the courts are by
no means in agreement as to what constitutes an "attractive nuisance."
Inasmuch as the determination of a particular object as an attractive
nuisance controls the application of a doctrine which will nullify a
property right and give effect to personal rights which, without the
doctrine, would not exist, it would seem that the problems of attractive
nuisance can be reduced to this common denominator: the conflict be-
tween the property right of the occupier of land to exclusive possession
and the personal right of the child to be free from subjection to unrea-
sonable risks of harm. It is probably not oversimplifying the problem
to state that the courts will label particular instrumentalities "attractive
nuisances" and apply the doctrine in direct proportion to the extent to
which those courts are willing to give precedence to the personal rights
of the child over the property rights of the occupier of land.
One of the basic considerations in classifying an object as an "at-
tractive nuisance" is the determination as to whether "the utility to
the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as compared to the
risk to young children involved therein." 43 The determination that
utility is slight as compared to risk is nothing more than an application
to the question of attractive nuisance of the fundamental rule of the
law of negligence that the standard of conduct below which specific
acts are negligent is arrived at by weighing the utility of the actor's
conduct against the magnitude of the risk of harm to others arising
from such concuct." If it is ascertained that utility is slight as com-
pared to risk, negligence is established if a duty exists on the part of
3 Emond v. Kimberly-Clark Co., supra, note 34.
s 65 C.J.S. Negligence §29(3); Schulte v. Willow River Powder Co., 234 Wis.
188, 290 N.W. 629 (1940) ; Lentz v. Schuerman Bldg. & Realty Co., 359 Mo.
103, 220 S.W. (2d) 58 (1949).
39 Supra, note 35.
40 65 C.J.S. Negligence §29(12).
41Supra, notes 12 and 40; Louisville & N.R.Co. v. Vaughn, supra, note 20.
42Supra, note 40; Puchta v. Rothman, 221 P. (2d) 744 (Cal. App., 1950).
43 Supra, note 18.
"Prosser on Torts, sec. 35.
[Vol. 34
COMMENTS
the occupier, and that duty is supplied by giving effect to the trespassing
child's personal rights in the face of the occupier's property rights.
Some of the more specific limitations upon what can come under
the heading of "attractive nuisances" are merely expansions of this
general proposition. The courts consider that where the condition of
the land is natural,45 where it is not inherently dangerous,48 where, in
some jurisdictions, it is not unusually attractive to children,47 or where
the occupier is not chargeable with real or constructive knowledge of
the danger and the likelihood of trespass 8 he should not be burdened
with a duty toward trespassing children. The personal tights of the
children will not be given effect to the point of undue interference with
the possessory rights of the occupier.
On the question of attractiveness the courts differ and have de-
veloped three views. The first of these would limit attractive nuisances
to those objects in such a position as to naturally attract children from
the outside and thereby induce the trespass ;49 the second would include
objects to which children were attracted after they had become tres-
passers ;5o the third would abolish the requirement of attractiveness. 5'
Taken as rules of law these three views appear contradictory. How-
ever, if they are considered merely as degrees to which the courts will
go in enforcing the child trespasser's rights over those of the land-
owner, they become much less so, and they fall exactly into line with
the general proposition above developed that the solution to the attrac-
tive nuisance problem lies in the answer to the question as to how far
the courts will go in recognizing the rights of a trespassing child.
The attractive nuisance doctrine has been, from its inception, very
controversial in the law. It has been condemned as pure sentiment un-
founded in law or logic. It has been lauded as a triumph of humane
principles over harsh common law rules. It has been the subject of
a great multitude of judicial opinions and numerous treatises. How-
ever, if the problem is approached as part of the conflict of property
and personal rights, and as arising from a desire by the courts, based
upon humanitarian considerations, to extend personal rights at the ex-
pense of property rights to a point determined by sound public policy,
which necessarily will differ with the various jurisdictions, the fact
that the line is drawn at different points and that different reasons are
given therefor should not affect a basic understanding of it.
RoBERT F. BoDEiN
45 Supra, notes 34 and 36.4 6 Supra, note 38.
47 Supra, note 35.4 8 Supra, notes 12 and 18.
49 Supra, notes 12-17.5o Supra, notes 18-23.
51Supra, notes 24-31.
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